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Comments and Casenotes
LEGAL CAUSE IN TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS
UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT
By

ROBERT

M.

WRIGHT

Since the enactment of the antitrust laws in 1890 plaintiffs seeking recovery under the treble damage provisions have been relatively
unsuccessful. One difficulty facing many such plaintiffs has been that
of establishing standing under the restrictive requirements of the decisional law. However, decisions in the past year may indicate that
the courts are ready to redefine these requirements so as to permit
suit by certain classes of plaintiffs who, in the past, have been denied
relief due to their inability to show an "injury" under the treble damage
provisions.
On its face, Section 4 of the Clayton Act would seem to provide
relief for any party who could show an injury resulting from an antitrust violation.' However, the broad language of the statute has been
narrowed by judicial construction, and a plaintiff must meet specific
requirements to qualify for relief.2 A mere violation of the antitrust
statutes does not support a private action;3 there must be a resulting
injury to some party for damages to be awarded under this section.
The cause of action must be personal to the plaintiff, and not an injury
suffered by the public generally.' A showing that there was also injury
to the public was once considered essential for recovery,5 but more
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1965) provides:

Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has
an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
2. E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 20-39 (1965)
Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust
Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 691 (1962), reprinted from 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION
341 (1962) ; Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in
Treble Damlage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 231
(1961) ; Note, Standing To Sue For Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 570 (1964).
3. American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Industries, Inc., 360 F.2d 977
(8th Cir. 1966); Wolf v. National Lead Co., 15 F.R.D. 61 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
4. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Hotel
1964) ; Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 206
rev'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963)
men Barbers, 195 F. Supp. 664, 669-70 (W.D. Mo.

Co., 327 F.2d 725, 732 (8th Cir.
F. Supp. 924, 936 (D. Del. 1962),
; Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journey1961).

5. Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft Shop, 194 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Cal. 1961). See
Riggall v. Washington County Medical Society, 249 F.2d 266, 268 (8th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1957), where the complaint was held defective since it had
not charged an economic burden on the public by reason of the defendant's acts.
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recent decisions indicate that such a showing is no longer required
once a violation has been shown.'
Although the statute requires the plaintiff to be injured in his
"business or property, ' 7 the plaintiff need not be engaged in a going
business to recover. Where the plaintiff was prepared and intended
to enter business but was prevented from engaging in business because
of the -defendant's actions, recovery has been allowed," but a mere
expectation or hope of entering a future business is insufficient. In
9
Broadcasters,Inc. v. Morristown Broadcasting Corporation,
the plaintiff had applied to the Communications Commission for a radio station
license and alleged that an unlawful conspiracy by the defendants had
caused a delay in the processing of the application. The court ruled
that there was no business or property interest of the plaintiff's involved, but merely an expectation.10 Waldron v. British Petroleum
Co.1 presents an extensive discussion of the meaning of business or
property under Section 4. In Waldron, the plaintiff had contracted to
import and sell Iranian oil. Suit was brought under Section 4, the
plaintiff alleging that the defendant's conspiracy prevented resale by
causing the contract deadline to expire. The court ruled that the plaintiff was not engaged in business because he did not have the necessary
financial resources to act as a principal in importing and selling oil.
As to expected contracts for resale in various stages of negotiation, the
plaintiff had a mere expectancy which lacked existing economic control.
Plaintiff further argued that he had a right to assign his contracts to
an importer and that this right of assignment constituted "business."
The court said that since the alleged conspiracy was aimed at the oil
industry, the plaintiff as an assignor would be only indirectly injured.
However, the court concluded that the contract with the Iranian
government was a property right within the meaning of the statute.
The plaintiff was thus held to have alleged a cause of action, and de6. In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 231 n.2 (1962); Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) ; Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
7. "Business or property" is used in the ordinary sense and means commercial
venture or enterprise. Broadcasters, Inc. v. Morristown Broadcasting Corp., 185 F.
Supp. 641 (D.N.J. 1960). In Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), the court states that plaintiffs may recover for injury to property
even if they have no business. Nichols v. Spencer International Press, Inc., 371 F.2d
332 (7th Cir. 1967) ruled loss of employment due to a "no switching" agreement was
an injury to business.
8. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa.
1946), aft'd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948). The
problem in proving damages where there are no business records to show what the
profit would have been should be noted. Generally, if damages can be estimated by
reasonable inference, such proof will be sufficient even though only an approximation.
Pennington v. United Mine Workers of America, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
9. 185 F. Supp. 641 (D.N.J. 1960).
10. See Peller v. International Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1955). Miley
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
242 F.2d 758 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957), denied standing to an insurance broker who had only the expectancy of a contract. In Brownlee v. Malco
Theatres, 99 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Ark. 1951), plaintiff was negotiating for the purchase of a theatre and was denied standing because he had no more interest in the
theatre than any member of the public who might have wished to purchase the property.
11. 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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fendant's motion to dismiss was accordingly denied. 2 The injury to
the plaintiff does not have to be of a particular type, nor does it have
to be unreasonable; once there has been a violation and injury, "the
issue becomes one of causation, not reasonableness. 8
The final element required for recovery is that the injury be
caused "by reason of" the violation. This requirement has proven to
be the most troublesome barrier for many plaintiffs to overcome in
their suits for treble damages under Section 4. The district and circuit
courts have interpreted the statute to require "conduct which proximately results in injury to the plain-tiff."' 4 Essentially this means that
even though the plaintiff has unquestionably been injured, he must
stand in a close enough relation to the defendant to warrant the award
of treble damages. An examination of the cases will show that the
term "proximate cause" does not have the meaning commonly associated with it in tort law.' 5
A narrow view of the treble damage provisions was taken in an
early case by the use of a restrictive definition of legal cause in Ames

v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. 6 where the plaintiff held

stock in a telephone company in which the defendant purchased a controlling interest. Defendant's management prevented the telephone
company from doing a profitable business, and the company was forced
into receivership, thereby rendering plaintiff's stock worthless. In a
suit for injury to his interest, the court denied the plaintiff standing
on the ground that there was no "direct" injury. Loeb v. Eastman
Kodak Co.' 7 followed shortly after Ames. In Loeb, the plaintiff was
a stockholder and unsecured creditor of a corporation which had been
driven into bankruptcy by the defendant. On distribution of the fund
realized at the receiver's sale, nothing was left for unsecured creditors
12. The court listed four factors that were important in determining whether a
party was in business:
(1) The background and experience of the plaintiff in his prospective
business;
(2) Affirmative action taken to engage in the business;
(3) Financial ability to engage in the business;
Id. at 81-82. (4) Consummation of contracts by the plaintiff.
The same test was applied in Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629
(5th Cir. 1966).
13. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566, 571-72 (4th Cir. 1963)
Ingram v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 252 F. Supp. 674 (D.N.M. 1966).
14. Weston Theatres v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 41 F. Supp. 757, 763 (D.N.J.
1941). There is authority for the position that the defendant's conduct need only be a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm in accord with the position of the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 (1934).
Ford Motor Co. v. Websters Auto Sales, Inc.,
361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966) ; Haverhill Gazette Co. v. Union Leader Corp., 333 F.2d
798 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964). See also McWhirter v. Monroe
Calculating Machine Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948) requiring almost a
certainty that the defendant's actions were the sole cause of the harm.
15. "Courts ... have been reluctant to allow those who were not in direct competition with the defendant to have a private action even though as a matter of logic
their losses were foreseeable." Snow Crest Beverages v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F.
Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956).
16. 166 F. 820 (Cir. Ct. Mass. 1909). See Pennsylvania Sugar Refining v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 166 F. 254 (2d Cir. 1908) (corporation given right
to sue).
17. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
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and stockholders. The court ruled that plaintiff had no standing and
that the right of action was in the corporation or its trustee in bankruptcy. The court pointed out that this was the rule at common law
and that a failure ¢to adhere to this view would, in effect, mean that
the anti-trust laws, by giving an action to thousands of individual
stockholders which would be better settled by one suit in the name of
the corporation, were intended to permit a multiplicity of suits. Furthermore, the conspiracy was not aimed at the plaintiff as a stockholder
or creditor, but rather was aimed at the corporation, and the shareholder-plaintiff was only incidentally and indirectly injured. There is
little question that the holdings of the Ames and Loeb cases were consistent with the general law' and were not necessarily decided with an
intent to establish a narrow definition of legal cause under the treble
damage provisions of the antitrust acts. It should be recognized at
the outset that the prospect of multiple suits was not the sole reason
for the common law rule. It is accepted theory that stockholders lose
their identity in the recognition of the corporation as a separate and
distinct person. By purchasing shares, the stockholder recognizes the
corporation as the controlling entity and, individually, is only entitled
to share in the earnings and the distribution of assets on liquidation.
Correspondingly, if one shareholder has been derivatively injured by
reason of an injury to the corporate entity, every other shareholder
has also suffered and must be accorded the same right of redress.' 9
The courts have long required the corporate entity to bring suit, as
opposed to the individual shareholder. This allows the damages
recovered to be available for the payment of corporate creditors and
for other purposes, including distribution to the shareholders as
dividends.2" In spite of this background, which undoubtedly heavily
influenced the Ames and Loeb decisions, a fear of multiple suits producing inordinately heavy liability has caused these cases to become the
foundation of decisions resulting in classes of plaintiffs, other than
shareholders or creditors, being excluded from bringing a treble damage action on the ground that they are only indirectly or derivatively injured. 2 '
18. Note, Procedure in Private Suits Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
32 COLUM. L. RFv. 335, 339-40 (1932).
19. E.g., Niles v. New York Central & H. R.R. Co., 176 N.Y. 119, 68 N.E.
142 (1903).
20. E.g., Waller v. Waller, 187 Md. 185, 49 A.2d 449 (1946) ; Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 168 S.W.2d 216 (1943).
21. To illustrate the evolution of the present doctrines, Ames was cited in Gerli
v. Silk Association of America, 36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), where the plaintiff was
the president and controlling stockholder of a corporation. He claimed damages by
reason of losses through the inability of the corporation to pay indebtedness owing
him, impairment of the value of his stock, losses of future salaries and commissions,
and injury to his credit and reputation. The court, consistent with prior law before
the passage of the antitrust acts, denied relief on the ground that a creditor could not
enforce a claim of the corporation and that loss of a corporate office and salary were
not his business under the statute but the business of the corporation. Ten years later
the Gerli case was construed to require a finding that a lessor could not recover for
loss of profits incurred as a result of injury to his tenant on the theory that the lessor
was a remote plaintiff under the holding of the Gerli case. Westmoreland Asbestos
Co., Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). In more recent
years the latter cases have been cited for the proposition that no person incidentally
injured or whose losses result only from a diminution of profitable relationships with

1967]

LEGAL CAUSE IN TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS

279

Stockholders,22 creditors, 23 corporate officers, 2' and employees2 5

are generally regarded as remote parties and are denied standing. The
recognized exception in the stockholder cases is that a derivative action
will be allowed on behalf of the corporation when the corporation
refuses or is unable to sue in its own right. 26 However, the action is
barred unless the corporation is in existence. 27 These principles have
been applied to partnerships; usually a partner is barred from bringing
suit for injury to his interest. 28 However, one partner may sue on its
behalf where the partnership is unable to sue2 9 or where prosecution
of the suit is an act appropriate to winding up.' °
Another major area where a class of plaintiffs has been considered remote when the violation and fact of injury are undisputed
is the line of cases in which a landlord is suing for injury to his lessee
when he has lost his lease or where the lease is for a percentage of the
lessee's profits and those profits have been diminished. Generally, if
the plaintiff's lessee is not involved in the defendant's conspiracy, the
plaintiff will be regarded as indirectly injured and, being considered
merely a creditor, will be denied standing.8 However, when the lessee,
the party "directly" affected by an antitrust violation has a right of action for treble
damages. E.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.
1951) ; Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D.

Mass. 1956).
22. E.g., Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958).
23. E.g., Gerli v. Silk Association of America, 36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1939). It has been stated that the policy behind refusing recovery here, other than
the fear of a multiplicity of suits, is that it would give him a preference over other
creditors, thereby thwarting the policy of the Bankruptcy Act. Congress Building
Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1957).
24. E.g., Walder v. Paramount Publix, 132 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mass. 1939).
25. Where the plaintiff is an employee of the injured company he has been denied
standing on the ground that his injury is derivative. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mass. 1939) ; Corey v. Boston Ice Co.,
207 F. 465 (D. Mass. 1913).
26. In Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962), the corporation was in control of the defendant. The court gave a minority stockholder standing
to sue even though the majority had voted not to bring an action. See Fanchon and
Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
27. E.g., New Sanitary Towel Supply v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 211 F.
Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
28. E.g., Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
836 (1952).
29. In Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965),
the general partners had incapacitated themselves by divesting themselves of power
to do any act in behalf of the partnership and had authorized a representative to act
for them. The representative was unwilling to sue because of affiliations with the
defendant. The court ruled that a limited partner could sue on behalf of the partnership. In D'Ippolito v. Cities Service Oil Co., [1967 Transfer Binder] TRAM RrG. RUP.
72,034, at 83, 679 (2d Cir. 1967), the plaintiffs were originally partners who formed
New Jersey corporations which subsequently merged into a Delaware corporation.
The court ruled that the plaintiffs could sue for damages to the partnership in so far
as they were not assigned to the New Jersey corporations and the Delaware corporation or in so far as assigned by the corporations to the plaintiffs. Claims for the New
Jersey corporations could be sued on by the plaintiffs if reserved to them in the merger.
30. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
31. E.g., Melrose Realty v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Harrison
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
The same result has been reached when a patent owner sues for royalty losses
attributed to injuries to his licensee. Productive Inventions v. Trico Products Corp.,
224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).

ir
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to further other business interests, has joined with the defendant in his
actions, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held, in accord with
other cases, that the lessor is directly injured. 8 This result was
justified on the ground that there is no substantial danger of a multiplicity of suits, as in the stockholder cases, or of thwarting other
policies, as in the creditor cases.83 Furthermore, the court argued
that if the landlord were not allowed to sue there would be no private
remedy against the defendant's actions and stated that the defendant
should not be permitted to insulate himself from liability by inducing
the lessee to join his scheme. 4 Consistent with this reasoning courts
have recognized that an employee may maintain an action against persons who have conspired with his employer thereby causing a loss of
sales commissions or preventing him from seeking employment elsewhere. 5 It has also been recognized that a violation may result in
injuries to a stockholder which are separate and distinct from the in32. Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Steiner
v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956) (coercion to grant a
more favorable lease); Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 166 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1957). However, this case has not been accepted in New York. In
Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 332
F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964), the district court said: "a landlord may not recover for antitrust violations affecting the business of his tenant, whether the tenant be a party to
the violation or not." 221 F. Supp. at 690.
33. Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's Inc. 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957). For a
criticism of this view, see E. TIMB]RLA1, , 1gDs-RAL TREBLF DAMAGE ANTITRUST
AcTIoNs § 4.06 (1965) ; Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a TrebleDamage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. Rtv. 691, 706 (1963).
34. The court's statement is based on the theory that the lessee would be the only
other possible plaintiff and would be barred from suit because he has participated in
the alleged antitrust conduct, thereby being in part delicto. See Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corporation, 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967). But where the
party participating in the misconduct has been coerced into the improper activity by
economic duress, he is not deemed to be in part delicto and may bring an action.
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 268 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
35. In Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1948),
the plaintiff was an advertising solicitor employed on a commission basis. His employer withdrew a large account from him in order to give it to a large national
advertiser pursuant to an allegedly illegal agreement. The employee was held to have
standing even though the withdrawal was in accordance with the employment contract.
Although not cited, Vines appears to have been rejected in Robinson v. Stanley Home
Products, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass.), af'd, 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959),
where the employee was a sales representative in the New England area. The plaintiff
obtained orders from the defendant, and thereafter the defendant negotiated directly
with the plaintiff's employer for large purchases at a reduced price. The employer
then terminated plaintiff's services and accepted the offer. The plaintiff alleged that
the agreement was in violation of the anti-trust laws and that the reduced price was
achieved by eliminating his commission. The court held that the complaint did not
show a violation, but that even if it had, plaintiff could not recover since the loss of
commission was only a condition precedent to the agreement, not a result of the
agreement. See also Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942),
where the plaintiff was the exclusive sales agent of the defendant in an eight-state
area. Defendant and two other companies selling the same products combined activities
for the purpose of suppressing competition. As part of the scheme they divided and
allocated sales territory, thereby depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity to sell in
certain territories. Plaintiff was granted standing. This case was distinguished in
Robinson on the ground that the injury was a result of the wrongful acts and was,
therefore, direct. Where the employee has been prevented from obtaining employment
in the same industry as a result of his employer's agreements, the employee has been
given standing. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (agree-
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juries to the corporation and for which he may recover in his own

right. 6 The Fifth Circuit has indicated that a shareholder may be
directly injured and have a right of action if a wrong in violation of
a statute has caused him to part with his shares for less than their
actual value.8 7 However, the injury must not be derivative and therefore where a depreciation in value takes place as a result of injuries to
the corporation, relief will be denied. However, the Second Circuit
has denied relief where, pursuant to a conspiracy, a stifling of bids at
the plaintiff's auction sale forced him to sell his shares for less than
their actual value."
The court was of the opinion that the antitrust
acts only create liabilities for injuries directly affecting interstate commerce and that the plaintiff was not injured in his "commerce." The
court did not rest on this ground alone but went on to cite the prior
stockholder cases as establishing the rule that a shareholder may never
recover for injuries suffered by him individually but must look to the
general municipal law. Those cases should not be cited to support such
a rule because, as previously discussed, they merely followed prior law
for reasons unrelated to the antitrust acts. Furthermore, the early
cases did not necessarily intend to foreclose, nor did they have the
effect of foreclosing, a treble recovery to the shareholders. If the corporation sues and recovers treble damages, the shareholders, in theory
at least, realize a treble recovery. It is entirely possible that if a case
involving special injury to a shareholder had been presented to the
Ames and Loeb courts that they would have allowed the action, since
they would have recognized that a shareholder could sue individually
for this type of injury under the general law.89
The last significant type of suit in which standing has generally
been denied has been where a supplier, whose injury was a loss of sales
to customers whose purchases had been reduced as a result of the
alleged anti-trust violations of the defendant, brings an action under
ment to blacklist employee for violating employment contract); Nichols v. Spencer
International Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967) ("no switching" agreement
between employers).
36. United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 F. 574 (2d
Cir. 1916). In this case, the complaint stated that the defendants had conspired to
destroy the business, financial standing, and credit rating of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were in the business of promoting and financing companies dealing in copper.
The court held that the plaintiffs had a cause of action and that an allegation of a conspiracy to destroy certain copper companies was properly pleaded for the purpose of
showing a conspiracy, even though the plaintiffs were interested in the companies and
could not recover for corporate injuries.
37. Peter v. Western Newspapers Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1953). The
plaintiff alleged that as a result of defendant's activities his stock had depreciated and
he realized only a fraction of its prior value on sale. The court denied relief solely
because the depreciation in value resulted from the corporate injury and not from a
separate injury to the plaintiff.
38. Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958). See
also Peterson v. Borden Co., 50 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1931).
39. E.g., Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 F. 522 (6th Cir. 1897); Coronado Development
Corporation v. Millikin, 175 Misc. 1, 22 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Annot., 167
A.L.R. 285 (1947).
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Section 4.40 In Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc.,41
the customer was a manufacturer of syrups purchasing ninety percent
of its extracts from the plaintiff corporation. As a result of the defendant's exclusive dealing contracts, the sales of the customer diminished,
thereby reducing the sales of the plaintiff. The treasurer of the plaintiff corporation owned all the stock of the customer corporation and
fifty percent of the plaintiff's stock, the other fifty percent being held
by his wife. The court ruled that the plaintiff-supplier had no standing since it occupied the same position as the lessor in the landlord
cases, its loss "[resulting] only from an interruption or diminution of
profitable relationships with the party directly affected."42 Recognizing
that the plaintiff's losses were foreseeable, the court pointed out that
Congress had failed to amend the antitrust laws even though repeated
decisions had viewed the injury requirements narrowly. 4' The court
said that the result would be unchanged even if owners of the supplier
and its customer were identical and even if the customer were the only
entity purchasing from the supplier, since the organizers of the corporations "chose to take the advantages and disadvantages which flow
from separate legal personalities."44 In Volasco Products Company
v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company,4" the plaintiffs were two corporations with the same officers owned by the same stockholders. One
corporation was a supplier of raw materials to the second which produced the finished product. Again the identity of ownership was held
meaningless, and the supplier was found to be remotely injured.46
40. E.g., Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963) ; Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith
Orpheum Corp., 193 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v.
Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956). See Timberlake, The Legal
Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the
Antitrust Laws, 30 Go. WASH. L. Rzv. 231, 245 (1961). It is well settled that a
parent corporation's suit for injury to its subsidiary based only on the parent's ownership interest stands in no better position than any other stockholder's suit. Skouras
Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith Orpheum Corp., 193 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
cf. Seafarers Sea Chest Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1958
Trade Cas.) J 68,931, at 73, 744 (D.N.Y. Jun. 31, 1958).
41. 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
42. Id. at 909.
43. For an argument in favor of the present injury requirements stressing lack
of Congressional action as approval, see E. TIMBERLAKF, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE
ANTITRUST

AcTIoNs § 4.02 (1965).

44. 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956). See Montana Power Co. v. Federal
Power Commission, 185 F.2d 491 (D.D.C. 1950). In an analogous situation, a labor
union caused independent employees to strike, which resulted in the destruction of a
coal company. The coal company's sales agency sued for its resulting loss of commissions and was denied standing. United Mine Workers of America v. Osbourne Mining
Co., 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1961). The action was
brought under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187b (1959), the
wording of which is identical to Section 4 of the Clayton Act. However, the case was
decided on the basis of the anti-trust cases since the statute had not been interpreted.
45. 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963). But see
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), where
the defendant gained control of plaintiff's raw material suppliers. It was held error
for the court to rule as a matter of law that plaintiff was too remote to have standing.
46. "Corporations are separate entities, having various privileges, immunities, and
responsibilities, including the rights to sue and be sued. Individuals who desire to do
business through a corporation gain some advantages and probably sacrifice others.
[The plaintiffs], for reasons sufficient to them, decided to operate through two corporations and they must now abide by the consequences." 308 F.2d at 394.
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Prior to this past year, the only case to allow recovery to a supplier who had lost sales as a result of an injury to his customer was
Karseal Corporation v. Richfield Oil Corporation."' In Karseal, the
plaintiff was a manufacturer of automobile polish who sold his product
to independent distributors who, in turn, sold to service stations. The
defendant producer executed exclusive dealing contracts which restricted the purchase of automotive products by some 2,965 service
stations to those produced by the defendant. In holding that the plaintiff manufacturer had standing, the court borrowed language from
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc.,4 8 by stating that the

defendant's practices were directed at the manufacturers and distributors of competitive products with the intent to reduce their sales and
that therefore both the manufacturers and the distributors had a cause
of action. These persons were within the "target area," meaning that
they were "within that area of the economy which is endangered by
a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry" and
were "not only hit but aimed at. .

..

""

This past year, in Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm
50 the Eighth
Dairy, Incorporated,
Circuit Court of Appeals followed
Karseal on similar facts. In Sanitary Milk Producers, six small dairy
corporations, which were processors of raw milk, brought suit against
Sanitary Milk Producers, a dairy farm cooperative, for violations of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The defendant was engaged in the
business of marketing the raw milk of its members to local milk processors including the plaintiffs.5 ' Prices are higher for Class I milk,
which is raw milk processed as fluid milk, than for Class II milk,
which is raw milk processed into other dairy products. The prices
are set by the local Federal Milk Market Administrator per order of
the Secretary of Agriculture.52 Since the milk processors in the area
imported milk from other states and therefore were not purchasing
the defendant's full supply of raw milk, the percentage of defendant's
milk sold at the Class I price was less than it would have been if the
local processors had purchased defendant's full supply. As a countermeasure, defendant purchased a local milk processing plant, cut off its
supply of raw milk to the plaintiffs, and began producing the finished
47. 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955) ; 104 U. PA. L. Rlv. 543 (1956).
48. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951). In this case the defendant was alleged to have
agreed to furnish members of its union to certain movie studios at standard rates and
furnish its members to competing minor studios at prohibitively high rates. In order
to accomplish this, the defendant restricted its production. As a result, members of
the plaintiff union lost wages, and the union itself lost revenues by the withdrawal
of certain of its member unions. The court ruled that the plaintiff had no standing
since the conspiracy was not aimed at harming the union but was aimed at other
motion picture producers; plaintiff was deemed to have been harmed only incidentally:
...[I]n order to state a cause of action under the antitrust laws a plaintiff must
show more than that one purpose of the conspiracy was a restraint of trade and
that an act has been committed which harms him. He must show that he is within
that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive
conditions in a particular industry. Id. at 54-55.
49. 221 F.2d at 365.
50. 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
51. The facts of the case are reported in Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc. v. Sanitary
Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
5Z Id. at 478-79.
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product. A price war followed, which resulted in the defendant's slowly
gaining business at the expense of the plaintiffs.
Bergjans Farm Dairy was a processor selling its entire production to its wholly-owned sales company located in the same building
as Bergjans. Because of the defendant's activities, the sales company
experienced a decrease in its sales volume which resulted in reduced
purchases from Bergjans; however, the sales company did not bring
suit. The defendant objected to the lower court's ruling that Bergjans
had standing on the ground that Bergjans was not a competitor or
customer of Sanitary and was therefore a remote party which had
suffered no injury within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that Bergjans did
have standing to bring suit. It distinguished the principal case from
the Sixth Circuit decision in Volasco and the Massachusetts district
court decision in Snow Crest by pointing out that the plaintiff in the
instant case was the manufacturer of a finished product, rather than
a raw material supplier, and was therefore in direct competition with
the defendant; the court thus reasoned that "any recovery by Bergjans
is not in the nature of a windfall . .. Bergjans' injury is something

more than remote, is not derivative but direct, and is the proximate
result of Sanitary's misdoing."53
In addition to Sanitary Milk Producers, one other recent decision
would permit recovery by a plaintiff in this type of case. In South
Carolina Council of Milk Producersv. Newton,"' which was cited with
approval in Sanitary Milk Producers, the plaintiff was a nonprofit
association of raw milk producers, and the defendant was a processor
of milk who also controlled a chain of retail stores. The defendant
sold milk to the retail stores at below cost for resale to the public
below cost. Although the defendant billed its retailers at the South
Carolina Milk Commission minimum price, it rebated to the retailers
the amount of its loss. The defendant's intention was to use the milk
as a loss leader in order to attract customers to its stores in the hope
that they would purchase other products as well. The result was a
drop in the retail price of milk forcing plaintiffs to sell their product
at cost. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on
the grounds that the plaintiff's commodity was raw milk while the
defendant's was processed milk and that therefore no direct relationship or mutual competition existed between them. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit distinguished Volasco and
Snow Crest on the ground that the milk producers were not in a
supplier-seller relationship, but rather that they and the defendants
were selling an essentially equivalent commodity. It found that the
prior cases stood for the proposition that a supplier does not gain a
cause of action by reason of common ownership of the supplier and
the buyer in direct competition with the defendant. The court was
careful to note that it was merely drawing a factual distinction between
the case under consideration and Volasco and Snow Crest:
53. 368 F2d at 689.
54. 360 F2d 414 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966) ; 53 VA. L.

Rtv. 170 (1967).
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...if either of the cited cases be read as declaring that a supplier
who is not in privity or competition with one guilty of anti-trust
misconduct, but whose business is proximately affected by such
misconduct, can never have a claim for anti-trust damages against
the wrongdoer, we could not follow the decisions that far.
If a plaintiff can show himself within the sector of the
economy in which the violation threatened a breakdown of competitive conditions and that he was proximately injured thereby,
then he has standing to sue under Section 4.55
To the extent that the Volasco and Snow Crest cases stand for the
proposition that a supplier may never recover for damages caused by
injury to its customer, Sanitary Milk Producers and South Carolina
Council of Milk Producers have cast doubt on their validity. 56
The decision in Sanitary Milk Producers does not significantly
differ from Karseal. In both cases the plaintiffs were manufacturers
of a finished product and the courts in granting relief looked past the
immediate party standing between the plaintiff and the wrongdoer to
the real object of the wrongful acts. Although the original motive of
the Sanitary Milk Producers may have been only to gain an advantage
in the sale of raw milk and the alleged intent was to monopolize the
sale to retailers, a necessary object of the scheme adopted was to affect
competition in the sale of processed milk, the stage of production and
distribution in which plaintiffs were engaged. South Carolina Council
of Milk Producers goes significantly further because the object of the
defendant's scheme was to gain an advantage in the retail market,
not to monopolize or restrain raw milk production, which under the
reasoning of the prior cases would have resulted in a ruling that the
plaintiffs were indirectly injured. Unlike Karseal and Sanitary Milk
Producers, the plaintiff and defendant were in no way competitors,
and the court in holding the plaintiff has standing comes close to
saying that it will grant relief to a foreseeable plaintiff. The opinion
may indicate that where actions in violation of the anti-trust statutes
are designed to gain control over or restrain a segment of an industry,
relief will be granted to members of that industry at any stage of production or distribution, who, as a result, suffer a foreseeable injury.
Even if this decision is accepted, a later court, faced with a case in
which the defendant's purposes are not obviously to injure the plaintiff
and in which the prospective liability seems inordinately heavy, might,
of course, deny standing by restrictively interpreting the term "sector
of the economy" in the Fourth Circuit's formulation of the rule.
To support the result in Sanitary Milk Producers and South
Carolina Council of Milk Producers, the courts relied on the "target
55. 360 F.2d at 418.
56. The district court opinion in South Carolina Council Of Milk Producers dis-

tinguished Karseal on the ground that the supplier was furnishing a finished product
while in Snow Crest, even though the supplier's product was a major ingredient, there
was no direct competition as in Karseal. The court then pointed out that in the case
under consideration the raw milk was only an ingredient - although a major one in the manufacture of the finished product. At a minimum, it would seem that the
Fourth Circuit intends to bar a supplier only if his product is not a major ingredient

of the finished product.
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area" concept as expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Karseal. Most
courts today appear to be confronting these issues in terms of this
doctrine. As a result, there has been a gradual repudiation of the
earlier requirements of privity or direct competition and a movement
away from arbitrary classification of plaintiffs. 57 Attention is now
focused on the relationship between the plaintiff's injury and the purpose of the alleged misconduct. A recent decision has defined the
target area as the "relevant market." ' A discussion of the relevant
market as defined in anti-trust case law is beyond the scope of this
comment, but it may be said that the definitions are so varied that
no adequate guide for determining when a plaintiff will be in the protected sector of the economy has been provided as yet. 9 Since there
is no standard to determine when a plaintiff is within the sector of the
economy endangered by a breakdown in competitive conditions, the
target area concept allows a court to grant or deny standing in accordance with its view of the proper balance between the need for private
enforcement of the anti-trust laws and the danger of windfall recoveries
and disproportionate liability. 60 The doctrine has not, as yet, significantly opened the doors to plaintiffs who were denied standing in the
past. The few cases that have sought to extend the recognized area
of legal injury usually quote the dicta of Supreme Court decisions as
approval for a more lenient stand on injury requirements. 6 However,
57. See Schulman v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 847, 851 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), holding that even if the plaintiff is not a customer or competitor of the defendant he has standing if he is injured and is "aimed at."
58. In Epstein v. Dennison Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.)
1 71,953, at 83,377 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1966), the plaintiff developed an inventory tag
fastening device and alleged that defendant, having obtained the patent by fraud,
was using it to dominate the market in tag fastening devices. The court said standing
should be allowed to all those in the target area: "Stripped of technicalities, this
approach amounts to little more than requiring that there be some meaningful relationship or 'proximate cause' between the damages claimed and the particular anticompetitive impact on the relevant market." Id. at 83,378. The court then denied
standing because the plaintiff did not show that he was a competitor, customer or
otherwise involved in the market restricted by the defendant's acts.
59. For a general discussion, see M. MASSEL, COMPErTION AND MONOPOLY
259-78 (1962).
60. Cf. Epstein v. Dennison Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.)
1 71,953, at 83,377 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1966).
61. In Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948), which decided that sale and refining of sugar was interstate commerce, the
Court said: "The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who
are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated."
Id. at 236. In Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), the
plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to destroy a competitive league in which
plaintiff once played and pursuant to the agreement boycotted the plaintiff and
prevented him from becoming a player-coach in the defendant Pacific Coast League.
Each team used a standard contract which prohibits a player from signing with
another team without the consent of the team holding the player's contract. The
contracts were enforced by agreements to black-list any player violating them and to
penalize recalcitrant clubs. In holding that petitioner's complaint was adequate in
regard to damages, the Court said:
Petitioner's claim need only be "tested under the Sherman Act's general prohibition on unreasonable restraints of trade," [citations omitted] and meet the
requirement that petitioner has thereby suffered injury. Congress has, by legislative fiat, determined that such prohibited activities are injurious to the public
and has provided sanctions allowing private enforcement of the antitrust laws by
an aggrieved party. . . . In the face of such a policy this Court should not add
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the Court has consistently declined to hear those cases where the issue
of whether the statute should be construed literally or narrowly could
be decided. As a result, its statements on the issue are generally
ignored by the lower courts. The Court seems to have contented itself
with uttering broad dicta with the hope that the lower courts will
work out the difficulties for themselves.
Although there is general agreement that the broad purpose of
the anti-trust laws is to promote a competitive economy,6 2 there are
strong views on both sides of the question of whether the present
method of limiting classes of plaintiffs adequately achieves this purpose. The argument favoring the present state of the law stresses
that recovery of treble damages is a drastic remedy which requires a
narrow construction of the statutes, 3 especially since many unfounded
claims are brought in the hope of settlement.64 Others disagree by
pointing to the costs, 65 time, 66 and complexity" of anti-trust suits as

justification for every possible incentive for the private litigant. Some
commentators point to the low plaintiff recovery rate as justification
for a literal construction of the statute as well as discretion in the trial
requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth
by Congress in those laws. Id. at 453.
Radovich was distinguished in Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.,
308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 1962). In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961), in deciding that private plaintiffs did not have to
show public injury, the Court said:
Congress having thus prescribed the criteria of the prohibitions, the courts may
not expand them. Therefore, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under that section [15 U.S.C. § 1] allegations adequate to show a violation and,
in a private treble damage action, that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the

law requires. Id. at 660.

62. A primary object of the treble damage provisions is to provide the government with an aid in enforcing the substantive legislation. See Barber, Private
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman Experience, 30 GEo.
WASH. L. Rzv. 181 (1962); Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
63. See E. TIMBRRLAKx, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGx ANTITRUST AcTIoNs § 3.02
(1965).
64. Id. See also Johnson, Appraisal of the Report and its Major Recommenda-

tions,

CONVERENCE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND THt ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoM-

MITTzg RiPORT 15 (J. Rahl and E. Zaidins eds. 1955). The cost of defending an
antitrust suit claiming over $150,000 in damages has been estimated to run between
$17,000 and $250,000. Address by Everette Maclntyre before the joint meetings of
the Antitrust Sections of the Chicago Bar Association and Illinois State Bar Association, Jan. 18, 1962, reprinted in 108 CONG. Ric. 624 (1962) (remarks of Representative
Patman). To illustrate the threat posed by a treble damage action, courts have
recently awarded damages of $4,239,609 in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Pa. 1965) ; $16,873,203 in Ohio Valley Electric Corp.
v. General Electric Corp., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); and $48,696,616 in
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
65. Loevinger, Handling a Plaintiff's Antitrust Damage Suit, 4 ANTITRUST BULL.
29, 37 (1959).
66. Id. See also Wham, supra note 62.
67. M. MASSEL, COMPFTITION AND MONOPOLY (1962) at 145, notes that in Sugar
Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), the trial took one year with the judge
spending fourteen months writing a 178 page opinion and a 58 page finding of fact.
In Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 92 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), there were 70,000
pages of records, 45,000 exhibits and 700,000 pages of documents. The government, in
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
submitted a 634 page summary of facts, 87 pages of law and 6,224 pages of excerpts
from documentary evidence.
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judge to award compensatory or treble damages.68 These commentators stress that if discretion were given the trial court, it would find
for the plaintiff on proof of an injury, thereby increasing the percentage of recovery. The argument for discretion usually points to
the problem of the "innocent" defendant who has acted on the advice
of counsel, or without such advice, and has inadvertently violated the
law, or has had a previously lawful act transformed into an unlawful
one by judicial decision. 69 This argument stresses that the unfairness
of such a situation calls for a restriction of standing requirements.
The reply to the discretionary damage proposal is that courts would
rarely award treble damages if they were given the choice. 70 Furthermore, due to the cost, expense, and possible recriminatory actions,"
a plaintiff must have the treble damage incentive because he is unlikely
to bring suit if he must bear the risk of having his recovery limited
to actual damages. 72 If the private plaintiff is discouraged from
bringing suit and if there is a significant drop in the number of actions
brought, these commentators claim a great burden would be placed on
the Justice Department. 73 Economists have also been critical of antitrust enforcement on the ground 'that the effects of various business
practices on the economy have never been determined. They argue
that the present laws and decisions do not adequately separate the
market conditions and business practices that are favorable to the public
interest from those that are not and that these factors
should be the
74
basis for deciding whether a penalty is in order.
In conclusion, there is a slow and cautious trend toward widening
the area of standing for the private plaintiff, with greater emphasis
on who is intended to be harmed by the wrongdoer's action and a
lessening concern over the possibility of multiple suits. Plaintiffs,
under the rulings of Sanitary Milk Producers and South Carolina
Council of Milk Producers, have somewhat greater latitude in establishing legal cause and are no longer barred because their injuries are,
in form, derived from an injury to another. The Section 4 plaintiff
68. Guilfoil, Private Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Law, 10 ANTITRUST BULL.
747 (1965). The writer claims that during the period of 1899 through 1939, plaintiffs
recovered in only 14 of 157 suits and from 1940 through 1963 in 57 out of 1539
reported suits. See also Cummings, Antitrust Administration and Enforcement, in
CONFSR*NC

ON THZ ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE ATTORNEY G9NZRAL'S COMMITTEE

REPORT 166 (J. Rahi and E. Zaidins eds. 1955).

69. Johnson, supra note 63, at 30; Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages
Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 570 (1964).
70. Loevinger, Private Action - The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, in 1 ANTITRUST LAW AND TsCHNIQUSs 384 (M. Hoffman and A. Winard eds. 1963); Wham,
supra note 62, at 1062.
71. McConnell, The Treble Damage Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50 Nw. U.L. REv.
342, 348 (1955). For examples of recriminatory actions taken against private plaintiffs,
see 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1057 nn.309-12 (1952).
72. Schwartz, The Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 37, 55 (1956).
73. Wham, supra note 62, at 1062, says that without the private suit the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department would need four times the appropriations to take
up the slack.
74. M. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 19-26 (1962); G. STOCKING,
WORKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 183-240 (1961); Mason, The
Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the U.S., 62 HAxv. L. lyv. 1265, 1284
(1949); Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 46 (19375.
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must now focus on convincing the court that he is sufficiently involved
in the threatened sector of the economy to be entitled to relief.
It seems clear that neither the lower courts nor the Supreme
Court are prepared to broaden the interpretations of the treble damage
provisions to a significant extent in the absence of legislative action.
The courts are understandably -reluctantto make sophisticated economic
judgments on methods of implementing the anti-trust laws. A drastic
broadening of the standing requirements substantially increasing the
number of successful private actions could have a significant effect on
current business practices and the country's economic structure.
Perhaps some of the reluctance to broaden standing arises out of'
the very nature of anti-trust matters. It can be argued that the courts
are not equipped by experience or by skilled assistance to enunciate
economic policy, 75 that trial procedures are not geared to presentation
of the evidence in a complex case in a clearly understandable manner,
and that judicial review is difficult. 76 By the same token, the prospects
for legislative action are dim; there is no widespread antagonism
against big business as there was in the period when the Sherman Act
was passed.7" Today, big business has become well-accepted and there
is a widespread though possibly inaccurate feeling that large industries
are operating efficiently and are striving to keep prices down. 8
No easy answer is at hand in this area where there are numerous
divergent views7 0 and policy considerations and where sudden change
could have far-reaching economic effects.8" Only after judging or prejudging these many factors would it be an answer to say that Congress
intended the statute to be read literally.'
Since the statute, on its
75. Justice Frankfurter commented in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337

U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1949) :

The dual system of enforcement provided for by the Clayton Act must have
contemplated standards of proof capable of administration by the courts as well
as by the Federal Trade Commission and other designated agencies. (Citations
omitted.) Our interpretation of the Act, therefore, should recognize that an
appraisal of economic data which might be practicable if only the latter were faced
with the task may be quite otherwise for judges unequipped for it either by
experience or by the availability of skilled assistance.
76. Prettyman, Needed: A New Trial Technique: Suggestions for the Trial of
Complicated Cases, 34 A.B.A.J. 766 (1948).

77. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OP AN AMERICAN TRADIrION 565-68 (1955).
78. M. MASSEL, supra note 59, at 26, states that studies of the relationship
between competition and innovation are incomplete, but there are indications that
large companies are not the principal innovators.
79. See Address by Lee Loevinger before the American Society of Corporate
Secretaries, June 19, 1962, reprinted in 108 CONG. Rc. 13322-26 (1962) (remarks of
Senator Kefauver).
80. Loevinger states:
It should also be understood that antitrust cases are political in the sense that
the decisions of the courts in these cases actually make policy as to the character
and structure of our society of a degree greater than in any other class of cases,
except possibly a few cases in constitutional interpretation. Loevinger, Antitrust,
Economics and Politics, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 225, 259 (1955).

81. H.

THORELLI,

supra note 77, at 571, is of the opinion that Congress in enact-

ing the Sherman Act purposely utilized broad phrases:

. . . to make use of that certain technique of judicial reasoning characteristic
of common law courts. Aware that the modes of restraint will vary considerably
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face, seemingly imposes absolute liability once damage has been shown,
the courts may well be correct in refusing to give it such a reading.
From a logical standpoint, it would seem that some exception must
be made to the literal language. It is a valid exception to deny standing for a truly derivative injury, as was done in the early stockholder
cases. However, the rule of these early cases has been used in factual
contexts that may not be appropriate for its application, with a resulting degree of decisional inconsistency among the circuits. In the foreseeable future, absent some new wave of anti-trust sentiment which
might move the courts to the literal reading or Congress to legislative
action, it appears that there will be no substantial clarification of the
present standard. The predictability of a plaintiff's success in establishing standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act will continue to
require a sensitivity to the particular facts present, since legal cause
has a no more fixed definition now than it has had in the past.
from one industry and period to another, Congress thus deliberately provided for
a certain degree of flexibility in the law.
Apparently it has never been clear at any time what effect the antitrust laws are intended to have on the economic structure. In commenting on the enactment of the
statutes of 1890, Thorelli states:
It must be assumed that legislators were aware of the disturbing lack of data
concerning the nature and growth of industrial combinations in the postwar (civil
war) period. A number of state and federal investigations were undertaken, but
they served mainly to indicate the magnitude of the problems involved. It is
true a considerable body of information was amassed, yet little was attained in
the way of system and perspective. Id. at 570.
It seems that the closest thing to a comprehensive study that has been done since the
turn of the century was that compiled by the Temporary National Economic Committee which was appointed by Congress in 1938. The Committee took almost three
years, heard 552 witnesses and produced an 80 volume report, but with the advent of
World War II, the study was forgotten. Loevinger, supra note 80, at 232.

